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Abstract 
Policies to regulate pesticides at the national level have not changed 
as new issues, such as groundwater contamination, have emerged. Therefore, 
various states are responding. This paper discusses recent state 
initiatives in regulating pesticides to prevent groundwater contamination, 
and suggests trends in these policies. A survey of legislators who have 
sponsored pesticide/groundwater contamination legislation is presented. 
Survey results show the factors affecting bill introduction, the influence 
of interest groups on the bills, important issues in bill debate, and 
trends in future legislation. A statistical analysis of the survey states 
and survey responses is also presented, using economic, political, and 
physical factors as explanatory variables. 
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Introduction 
U.S. agricultural production has grown at an unprecedented rate since 
World War II, and pesticides have contributed significantly to that growth 
(Antle and Capalbo 1986). Although the benefits of pesticide use are 
immediate, recognition of the external costs has been slow to come. As 
added information on the external impacts of pesticides used in agriculture 
has developed, problems including pest resistance, secondary pest 
outbreaks, pesticide residuals in the environment, and pesticide 
contamination of food have been increasingly recognized. 
In response to concerns about pesticides, public policy has evolved 
from protecting farmers as users of pesticides to protecting the public 
from adverse external effects. Recent developments in the technology for 
pesticide detection have contributed as well to increased public concern 
about chemical residues in the environment, and in particular, about 
pesticides in groundwater. This concern has led to renewed interest in 
regulatory policies. 
At the national level, efforts to extend the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947 (FIFRA) have not been successful. 
Alternatively, some states have pushed ahead with pesticide regulation. 
While fear of "patchwork quilt" regulation is prompting the pesticide 
industry to urge federal action, environmental and consumer groups have 
supported advanced regulation in a number of states (Bureau of National 
Affairs 1987). At present, farm groups appear to have sided with the 
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chemical industry on pesticide/groundwater issues, but this coalition 
appears to be fragile at best (Padgitt 1987), 
In short, the current pesticide policy debate includes a diversity of 
interest groups interacting at various government levels. An 
understanding of the origins and the nature of state-level 
pesticide/groundwater policy is becoming increasingly important as the 
regulatory role of states is expanding. This knowledge is imperative for 
economic policy analysis (Strand and Bockstael 1989; Miranowski, 
Hrubovcak, and Sutton 1989), To contribute to an understanding of the 
institutions and the policy process, this paper evaluates a survey of 
state pesticide/groundwater legislation during 1987 and 1988. This 
assessment provides current information on how state policy is formed and 
what trends in state pesticide regulation are likely in the future. 
Background 
Originally a bill that protected buyers from unscrupulous pesticide 
producers and dealers, FIFRA has since become the dominant federal 
regulatory statute for pesticides. FIFRA initially authorized the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to regulate the sale and use of 
pesticides. However, USDA was given little power to enforce FIFRA. In 
addition, USDA was sympathetic to farm interests and had limited incentive 
to regulate pesticides that were beneficial to farmers. Although most 
states also regulated pesticides in this early period, the associated 
statutes largely paralleled FIFRA. Federal policies protecting users and 
consumers were the dominant force in regulation. 
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Executive Reorganization Plan Number 3 created the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, establishing it as the primary regulator 
of pesticides, and transferring authority away from USDA. In 1972, FIFRA 
was amended with the passage of the Federal Environmental Pesticide 
Control Act (FEPCA). FEPCA gave EPA the authority to register pesticides 
for general and restricted use, to cancel or suspend registration, and to 
explicitly consider environmental protection in regulating pesticides, as 
well as socioeconomic costs and benefits (Antle and Capalbo n.d.). 
Only minor amendments have been made to FIFRA since 1972. Attempted 
major revisions, such as those in the 99th Congress, have failed because 
of lack of consensus on issues such as risks of groundwater contamination, 
patent term restoration, farmer liability, and tolerance standards (Mayes 
1989). However, the lOOth Congress ignored these controversial issues and 
amended FIFRA, The amendment included increased registration fees, 
accelerated reregistration of older pesticides, elimination of 
indemnification payments, and increased regulations on storage, disposal, 
and handling of pesticides. 
In recent years, there have been extensive analyses of pesticide 
policy issues at the federal level. Macintyre (1987) and Bosso (1987) 
have both focused on the development of pesticide policies. Macintyre 
discussed the political and economic forces that have shaped pesticide 
policy from the immediate post-war period to 1970 and concluded that 
conspiratorial behavior of interest groups was not the driving force in 
the development of federal pesticide policy during this period. Bosso 
also considered political factors in assessing the history of pesticide 
policy from the immediate postwar era into the 1980s. Bosso described how 
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the influence of the agricultural community was superseded by 
environmental and consumer influence over time, and how more restrictive 
pesticide policies have evolved in response. 
While legislators and interest groups struggled with the pesticide 
law at the federal level, states began to take action. One of the primary 
issues prompting policy initiatives at the state level was information 
about pesticide contamination of groundwater (see Chavas 1989). In 1979 
the pesticide aldicarb was found in Long Island groundwater. Shortly 
thereafter, pesticides were found in the groundwaters of Florida, 
California, and Wisconsin (Holden 1986). Since then, more than 60 
pesticides have been found in the groundwaters of 30 states (Batie and 
Diebel n.d.). 
Swift state legislative action has followed. The more site-specific 
nature of these problems has also contributed to the success of states in 
adopting pesticide regulations. The federalist policies of the Reagan 
administration may have encouraged state action in regulating pesticides. 
Analyses of the development of state policies include Batie and Diebel's 
work, which provided a historical overview of state agrichemical/ 
groundwater policy development and presented a taxonomy of various state 
policies. Benbrook (1989) briefly reviewed state and federal policies 
with respect to agricultural chemicals and groundwater quality, and 
suggested that future policies include economic as well as environmental 
concerns. The Bureau of National Affairs (1987) also reported on trends 
in federal and state policies. 
Congress has periodically increased the authority of EPA through 
various statutes such as FEPCA (1972), the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), 
5 
the Clean Water Act (1977), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(1976), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (1980). The increased authority has enabled EPA to provide 
incentives for state-level pesticide regulation through its 1987 Proposed 
Pesticide Strategy. Suggesting a multipronged management approach with 
varied federal and state roles, EPA has mandated that states develop and 
implement management plans based on area-specific differences in 
groundwater use, value, and vulnerability. The strategy has encouraged 
coordination among state agencies and state and local governments, as well 
as among different states. 
Through the Proposed Pesticide Strategy, EPA will administer uniform 
policies for pesticides, establish generic prevention measures for 
groundwater threats independent of loc~l vulnerability, encourage a strong 
state role in preventing and responding to pesticide contamination, and 
oversee state management plans. If management plans do not address 
ground- and surface water contamination problems, EPA will intervene to 
restrict or regulate pesticide use (USEPA 1987). 
As states have moved ahead to contain pesticide contamination, 
special-interest groups have become concerned with the consequences of 
state authority and the setting of local tolerance standards (Davis 1987). 
In this process, environmental and consumer interest groups have tended to 
support states' rights to set water standards under various federal 
statutes, including the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act. 
Chemical industry groups have tended_ to support uniform national 
standards. 
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State Policies 
A number of states have supported combined pesticide and groundwater 
legislation. New York, Florida, California, and Wisconsin were among the 
first states to find pesticides l.n groundwater, and to implement 
associated regulatory policies. In the 1987-1988 legislative session, 
twenty-three other states considered such legislation. This legislation 
is the focus of the survey and its analysis. Of the legislation surveyed, 
that of Iowa, Connecticut, Arizona, and Hawaii is selected for special 
conDnent here because of high levels of legislative activity or significant 
new groundwater legislation. The following describes briefly the policies 
of the four lead states and the four others highlighted from the survey. 
New York 
Pesticide contamination of groundwater was first discovered in Long 
Island, New York--aldicarb was detected. Subsequent monitoring has since 
revealed residues of 12 additional pesticides, including ethylene 
dibromide (EDB) and carbofuran (Holden n.d.). Experimental studies have 
found it impossible to use aldicarb on Long Island and remain within state 
clean groundwater guidelines. However, withdrawal of the pesticide would 
have seriously undermined farmers' ability to control the Colorado potato 
beetle. Although no specific legislation was passed to address this 
problem, state and local officials acting in conjunction with pesticide 
manufacturers moved to restrict the use of aldicarb to selected regions of 
Long Island. A monitoring system was established to detect pesticides 
throughout New York, concentrating on Long Island (Holden n.d.). Remedial 
actions and restrictions apply if groundwater problems are detected. 
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Florida 
EDB contamination of groundwater prompted Florida to pass the 1983 
Water Quality Assurance Act. This act addressed surface water as well as 
groundwater. Largely administrative, it established a pesticide review 
council within the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, giving 
it the authority to (1) review EPA data on pesticides; (2) initiate 
scientific studies on pesticides when there is preliminary evidence of 
unreasonable adverse effects on health or the environment, or when there 
is doubt about the veracity of data submitted for registration; (3) 
apprise EPA of the environmental conditions where intense pesticide use is 
occurring; (4) request EPA to provide test data generated in Florida or in 
simulated conditions such as those found in Florida; (5) request 
information from EPA concerning decisions on pesticide registration; (6) 
make recommendations to the commissioner of agriculture on the sale or use 
of a chemical that has been reviewed; and (7) evaluate the feasibility of 
biological pest controls. The act also established a groundwater 
monitoring network. 
California 
In 1983 California enacted the Pesticide Contamination Prevention 
Act. This act laid the foundation for the collection of data on pesticide 
contamination of groundwater and established provisions for monitoring 
soils and water. The act required coordination between the departments of 
Food and Agriculture and Health Services. Water quality standards were 
permitted to be stricter than those of the EPA in this act. In cases of 
contamination, registrations· were canceled unless the registrant provided 
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proof that the pesticide was not a threat, or that use could be modified 
to reduce additional contamination, or if the pesticide withdrawal was 
found to cause a severe hardship on the agricultural industry. 
However, public concern over agricultural chemicals in public and 
private water supplies has led to a demand for greater regulation of 
agricultural chemicals in California. In 1986, Proposition 65 was passed 
with the support of 63 percent of the voters (Batie and Diebel n.d.). 
Proposition 65 established the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement 
Act, making it illegal for a firm with ten or more employees to knowingly 
discharge any chemical found to cause cancer or reproductive problems. 
The burden of proof in Proposition 65 is on the polluter rather than the 
state. In addition, the governor is required to report annually to the 
legislature a list of chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive 
problems. 
Wisconsin 
Discovery of aldicarb in Wisconsin groundwater supplies in 1980 
triggered a legislative response. In 1983, Wisconsin Act 410 was passed. 
The act established a two-tier system of standards for each regulated 
substance, consisting of enforcement standards and preventative action 
limits. Activities that resulted in contamination levels equal to or 
greater than the enforcement standard were prohibited. Preventative 
action limits triggered remedial action by the regulatory agencies and 
were set at 10, 20, or 50 percent of the enforcement standard, depending 
on the toxicological characteristics of the substances. 
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Wisconsin Act 410 gave various state agencies authority to establish 
standards, resulting in standards for almost all related pesticides found 
in Wisconsin groundwater to date. As is the case in California, these 
standards can exceed those of the EPA. In addition, Wisconsin has 
established standards for more chemicals than the EPA. A complex system 
of monitoring was established for multiple purposes, including problem 
assessment, risk assessment, and database development. Cooperation 
between agencies in sharing and coordinating the database on pesticides 
was mandated. The act also established a compensation fund to assist in 
repair or replacement of contaminated wells. Funding was to be obtained 
from registration fees for pesticides and a fertilizer tax. Taxes and 
fees were not established to affect use of agricultural chemicals, but 
simply as sources of revenue (State of Wisconsin). 
Iowa 
The Iowa Groundwater Protection Act of 1987 is perhaps the most 
comprehensive piece of state legislation considered. Although it was 
primarily a research and education b±ll, it was expected to raise between 
$38 million and $46 million in revenue within five years of passage 
(Hallberg, Cousins-Leatherman, and Kelly 1987). Revenues were to be 
obtained from increased registration fees for pesticides, household 
hazardous substances, solid wastes, underground storage tanks, and a tax 
on chemicals. Revenues were allocated to various funds within a 
Groundwater Protection Fund, established by the act. 
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There are four major components of the Iowa Groundwater Act, each 
regulating a potential source of groundwater contamination. The four 
sources identified include solid wastes, household hazardous substances, 
storage tanks, and agriculture. An account was established within the 
Groundwater Protection Fund for each area. Funds within the Agricultural 
Management Account were to be obtained from an assessment of license fees 
on pesticide dealers (0.1 percent of gross annual sales); registration 
fees for manufacturers (between $250 and $3,000 per year, based on 0.2 
percent of gross annual sales in Iowa, with exceptions by rule); and a 
nitrogen fertilizer tax of $0.75 per ton, based on an 82 percent nitrogen 
solution. 
Funds from this account were to be allocated to education and 
demonstration projects, monitoring of private rural wells, and programs to 
close abandoned wells. Revenues from this account also were allocated to 
the Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture, located at Iowa State 
University. The Leopold Center was established by the act to identify and 
reduce the negative impacts of agriculture on the environment, society, 
and the economy, as well as to conduct research on sustainable 
agriculture. The Iowa Groundwater Act also established a Center for 
Health Effects of Environmental Contamination, which was to conduct 
research on the health effects of pesticide contamination, as well as 
other types of contamination. 
The Iowa Groundwater Protection Act was the result of several years 
of legislative activity. Minor bills had been introduced in previous 
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legislative sessions that dealt with selected aspects of the act; however, 
it was not until 1987 that a comprehensive bill succeeded. Popular 
opinion supported the bill, as reflected by results from a Des Moines 
Register poll taken before the bill was passed (Roberts and Lighthall 
1988). Several legislators active in the passage of this bill are 
currently developing additional legislation on surface water. 
Connecticut 
In the 1982 Potable Drinking Water Law, the principle of strict 
liability for groundwater contamination was established. Under this 
principle, the state did not have to prove fault, negligence, or harm in 
assessing liability. No exemptions from liability were to be made, even 
when farmers were applying chemicals according to label directions. 
Controversy arose and farmers in Connecticut forced reconsideration of the 
act (Batie and Diebel n.d.). The result was House Bill 5981, which 
released farmers from potable water liability provided that they applied 
agricultural pesticides according to label directions; agreed to submit a 
plan for minimizing future groundwater contamination; and kept records on 
pesticide use, application rates, dates, and acreage treated for 20 years. 
Although this bill released farmers from potable water liability, they 
remained liable for property damage or personal injury. In addition, 
chemical companies were still liable for groundwater contamination. HB 
5981 also established a pesticide contamination response account for 
short- and long-term contamination problems. The bill was passed into law 
as Public Law 88-211, with a unanimous vote. 
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Arizona 
Since the early 1980s environmental concerns have been important in 
Arizona. The passage of the 1986 Environmental Quality Act was the result 
of a four-year effort by an environmental coalition, severa legislators, 1 
and Gov. Bruce Babbitt (Meeks 1987). Largely for groundwater quality, the 
act created a Department of Environmental Quality to regulate water and 
air quality and waste management programs. Aquifer classification by use, 
groundwater quality standards, and pesticide regulation were included in 
the act. 
In 1987 those most involved in the Environmental Quality Act 
introduced new legislation to expand regulation of potential groundwater 
contaminants. Two bills--Senate Bill 1341 and Senate Bill 1415--were 
introduced, both with similar content. Both bills failed: SB 1415 died 
in committee, and SB 1347 passed both houses but was vetoed by Governor 
Meecham. These bills would have established a Water Quality Assurance 
Revolving Fund financed from registration fees on fertilizers, pesticides, 
hazardous products, and industrial discharges. This fund would have 
financed remedial actions, monitoring, water degradation research, and 
administration costs. 
Hawaii 
Legislators in Hawaii have been active in sponsoring legislation on 
pesticides and groundwater quality. While there was no comprehensive 
piece of legislation, such as the Iowa Groundwater Act, sixteen bills were 
introduced during the one-year period used for the survey and analysis. 
These bills included provisions for pilot programs for pesticide disposal, 
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pesticide use restrictions, recordkeeping requirements, equipment 
requirements, liability assignments, establishing citizen complaint 
centers, workshops, monitoring groundwater, and developing systems to 
identify vulnerable areas and penalties. 
State Policy Instruments 
Economic, compliance, and administrative provisions are three types of 
policy instruments being used by states that have legislated groundwater 
policy (Table l). The first type, economic provisions, consists of 
pesticide taxes, registration fees, permit and license fees, and liability 
assignments. These provisions influence user and producer behavior through 
economic incentives. The second category, compliance provisions, also 
influences user and producer actions. However, the policy instruments in 
this category directly affect behavior by restricting pesticide use, 
disposal, and equipment, or by requiring test data, dealer and applicator 
licensing, or recordkeeping by manufacturers, dealers, and users. 
Underlying the definitions for the first two categories is the concept 
of property rights for pesticide users, dealers, manufacturers, and 
consumers. Property rights refer to a bundle of entitlements that define 
the owner's rights, privileges, and limitations for use of a resource 
(Tietenberg 1988). To the extent that pesticides are not taxed or assigned 
other fees or liabilities, and to the extent that pesticide use is not 
restricted, pesticide users, dealers, and manufacturers have the right to 
use, sell, or produce pesticides. As these restrictive policy instruments 
are more fully implemented, thereby limiting behavior, property rights will 
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Table 1. State Policy Instruments 
Policy Instrument NY FL CA WI AZ CT HI IA 
Economic Provisions 
Pesticide tax X 
Registration fee X X X X 
Applicator and dealer fee 
Liability X X X 
Compliance Provisions 
Information requirements X X X 
Disposal and handling 
requirements X X 
Equipment requirements X 
Applicator and dealer 
requirements X X 
Recordkeeping requirements X X X 
Sales and use requirements X X X X X 
Administrative Provisions 
Water quality funds X X X X 
Remedial action X X X X X X 
Enforcement X X X X X 
Monitoring X X X X X X X 
Database development X X X X 
Standards X X X 
Research X X X X X X 
Coordination among agencies X X X 
Education/training X X X 
Pilot projects X X 
Citizen complaints X 
NY = New York WI = Wisconsin HI = Hawaii 
FL = Florida AZ = Arizona IA = Iowa 
CA = California CT = Connecticut 
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be changed and transferred from the users, dealers, and manufacturers to 
the general public. 
Administrative provisions, the third category, primarily address state 
regulatory agencies. This category includes policy instruments used by the 
agencies to address short- and long-term contamination problems. These 
provisions affect pesticide users, dealers, and manufacturers indirectly, 
often through changes in economic and compliance provisions. 
Administrative provisions may also have direct effects on the rest of 
society. 
From Table 1, note that the first states to act in addressing 
pesticide contamination tended to respond more through administrative 
provisions than through economic and compliance provisions. The policy 
instruments used were directed more to immediate problems of contamination, 
and less to making institutional changes to prevent future contamination. 
A review of the four highlighted states in the survey shows more use of the 
instruments in the economic and compliance categories. Therefore, views on 
property rights appear to be moving from relatively few restrictions on 
sale and use of pesticides toward greater restrictions in this area. This 
results in a greater assignment of property rights to consumers of 
contaminated groundwater. Support for these more active and comprehensive 
environmental policies is reflected in the aforementioned popularity of the 
Iowa Groundwater Protection Act, and by the success of Proposition 65 in 
California. 
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The total number of provisions in all bills for each state policy 
instrument is recorded (Table 2). Observe that surveyed states have 
considered a wide variety of policy instruments. Within the economic 
category, registration fees and applicator and dealer fees were the most 
commonly considered provisions. Applicator and dealer requirements, as 
well as sales and use requirements, were the most commonly considered 
compliance provisions. Enforcement and research were the most frequently 
introduced administrative provisions. 
Survey Design 
The state survey instrument was constructed to track the development 
of pesticide/groundwater bills through the legislative process. 
Legislators were asked to indicate for how many years the 
pesticide/groundwater issue was of concern, the importance of various 
factors in stimulating interest in the bill, and the influence of various 
interest groups. They also were asked to rank the importance of selected 
issues being debated. 
A question on modifications made to the bill was asked as well. For 
bills that failed, legislators were asked to indicate key factors and 
interest groups involved. Legislators also were asked about their plans 
for reintroducing failed legislation or introducing new legislation, what 
provisions would be included, and the stands they expected various groups 
to take. Legislators who indicated they would not sponsor new legislation 
were asked the reasons for their decisions. Finally, legislators were 
asked about their tenure, occupation outside the legislature, and 
constituencies (urban, rural, or suburban). (See Appendix A--Survey 
Instrument.) 
Table 2. lbilets of lblicy Instruments in States ~ 
Policy lnstnne1t ALAZCAGrGI\HI IL IA KS MEMAMI ltllDN'fN:CH PA RI SD vr WA WI Totala Totalb 
Eccn:mic Provis:ims 
Pesticide tax 1 1 2 2 
Registratim fee 2 2 4 2 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 12 22 
Applicator arrl dealer fee 2 4 3 2 1 2 1 1 8 16 
Liability 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 8 12 
Ccnpl:ilnYoe Provisims 
Informatim recpiralelts 1 2 2 1 1 5 7 
Disposal B1'xi han:ll.iil! 
req.tiraiErrt:s 2 3 3 3 4 1 2 7 18 
Equipla-lt requirarent:s 1 2 1 3 4 
Applicator arrl dealer 
req.rlrarents 1 1 4 ·2 5 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 12 23 
Recordkeepirg req.ri.rara1ts 1 3 1 2 1 2 3 7 13 
Sales arrl use requirerents 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 13 22 ...... 
Mninistrative Provisims 
..., 
Water cpality furls 2 3 2 1 4 8 
Raood:ial act:i.rn 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 10 13 
Enfor0211lS!lt 2 2 1 3 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 15 28 
tmitorirg 2 2 1 1 1 1 6 8 
Data base devel.q:nalt 1 1 2 3 3 1 6 11 
Starrlards 1 1 1 3 3 
Research 2 1 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 10 17 
Coordinatim beu-n agaries 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 8 12 
Educatioo/trainirg 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 9 13 
Pilot projects 2 1 1 3 4 
Citizen cmplaints 1 5 2 6 
a Nrnber of states that :introduced bills with tha in:licated policy :inst.rurmts. 
b Nrnber of policy :inst.rurmts introduced in all bills in all states. 
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Sponsors of state pesticide/groundwater legislation for 1987-1988 
were identified from a list of 252 measures introduced to regulate 
pesticides. This list was obtained from Information for Public Affairs 
(IPA), a firm maintaining a database on current state legislation. From 
this list, 101 bills in 23 states were considered to be motivated by 
concerns about groundwater contamination. Sponsors and cosponsors of the 
bills were determined from IPA information or by contacting the state 
legislative research offices and libraries. Three hundred and forty-seven 
legislative sponsors or cosponsors were surveyed. 
The survey was conducted by mail using the Dillman (1978) procedure. 
The pretest used 17 legislators from Iowa, most of whom were involved in 
debate on the the Iowa Groundwater Protection Act. Only minor changes in 
the survey instrument were made as a result of the pretest. Therefore, 
responses from the pretest were included in this analysis of the survey. 
Cosponsors were surveyed because information on the primary sponsor 
was not always available. Respondents totaled 171 legislators, yielding 
an overall return rate of 49 percent. However, 36 (10 percent) of these 
respondents did not complete the questionnaire, either because they were 
cosponsors and felt that they were unable to answer satisfactorily, or 
because they were unsure about the applicability of the survey to their 
legislation. By omitting these respondents from the original sample size, 
the rate falls to 43 percent. Another way to view the response rate is by 
considering that 135 legislators (39 percent of the original sample) 
returned completed questionnaires. The three response rates are given by 
state in Table 3. Responses were obtained for 74 of the 101 bills, 
Table 3. Survey statistics by state, including number of bills, number of legislators 
surveyed, and response rates 
Response Rates a 
('.t) 
Number Number of Completed 
State of Bills Legislators Surveys Withdrawn A B c 
Alabama 2 2 1 1 100 100 50 
Arizona 2 14 8 57 
. California 7 9 6 67 
·Connecticut 1 19 9 47 
Georgia 1 1 0 0 
Hawaii 15 41 13 6 46 37 32 
Illinois 2 2 1 50 
Iowa 6 17 11 65 
Kansas 5 32 16 6 69 62 50 
Maine 3 7 4 1 71 67 57 ~ 
"' Massachusetts 7 23 11 48 
Michigan 3 25 6 7 52 33 24 
Minnesota 5 19 7 1 42 39 37 
Missouri 7 9 6 67 
New York 16 43 13 5 42 34 30 
North Carolina 2 2 0 1 50 
Ohio 2 2 0 0 
Pennsylvania 3 20 4 20 
Rhode Island 3 8 4 1 63 57 50 
South Dakota 2 4 2 50 
Vermont 1 1 1 100 
Washington 4 28 7 5 43 30 25 
Wisconsin 2 19 5 2 37 29 26 
Total 101 347 135 36 49 43 39 
a Calculation of response rates: A ~ (no. completed surveys + withdrawals) + no. legislators 
surveyed. B = no. completed surveys + (no. legislators- withdrawals). C = no. completed 
surveys + no. legislators. 
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representing 74 percent of those bills introduced during the sample 
period. The numbers of bills considered, legislators surveyed, 
questionnaires completed and returned, and respondents who withdrew are 
listed, along with response rates (Table 3). 
The bills tended to be team efforts, with more than half the 
respondents (55 percent) indicating the bill was introduced by a group of 
legislators. In many cases, the bills studied were the result of concerns 
expressed over several years. More than half the respondents indicated 
concerns leading to the legislation were expressed three or more years 
before the particular bill was considered. 
Results from survey question 2 (see Appendix A), on factors 
stimulating interest in the bill, are summarized (Table 4). Interest 
group pressure was the most significant factor in stimulating the 
legislation, with 37.2 percent of the respondents indicating it was very 
important and 24.8 percent indicating it was somewhat important. Interest 
in the bill was stimulated by informal discussions by legislators (56.2 
percent indicated this was very important or somewhat important). State 
or federally sponsored research, interim committees, and the media also 
influenced the legislation. Another important factor was evidence of 
contamination, or an existing environmental crisis in the legislator's 
district. Ten percent of the respondents identified this factor as a 
write-in answer. 
The purpose of survey question 4 was to determine the influence of 
interest groups before and during introduction of the bills. Results from 
this question are summarized (Table 5). Two similar questions also were 
asked, one about the legislation after introduction and one about future 
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Table 4. Factors Stimulating Interest in the State Legislation 
How important were each of the following factors in stimulating interest in 
drafting this bill? 
Factors 
State or federally sponsored 
research 
Special interest group concerns 
Commission appointed by 
legislature 
Legislative proposals from 
other states 
National legislative proposals 
Informal discussions on bill 
between legislators 
Interim committees 
Media 
VI SI MI su vu NR 
---------Percentage Responding--------
21.2 19.0 13.9 
37.2 24.8 13 .1 
9.5 13.1 13.1 
5. 1 18.2 15.3 
6.6 18.2 11.7 
27.0 29.2 19.7 
13.1 21.2 12.4 
10.9 21.2 21.2 
19.0 
9.5 
8.0 
23.4 
18.2 
8.8 
8.8 
19.0 
14.6 
5.1 
33.6 
22.6 
29.9 
5.8 
21.9 
16.8 
12.3 
10.3 
22.7 
15.4 
15.4 
9.5 
22.6 
10.9 
Note: For responses, VI = very important, SI = somewhat important, MI s 
of moderate importance, SU = somewhat unimportant, VU = very 
unimportant, and NR = no response. 
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Table 5. Responses on Interest Groups 
Please indicate the influence the following 
and during the introduction of this bill. 
interest groups exerted before 
SP WP NI WN SN NR 
Interest Groups --------Percentage Responding---------
Farmers 26.5 21.3 16.9 14.0 14.7 6.6 
Agricultural commodity 
organization 13.2 17.6 34.6 14.7 12.5 7.4 
Agribusiness representatives 11.0 18.4 31.6 16.2 12.5 10.3 
Chemical industry representatives 10.3 14.7 17.6 22.8 27.9 6.7 
Consumer groups 38.2 22.8 24.3 2.9 3.7 8.1 
Medical experts 14.7 30.1 39.0 2.2 2.9 11.1 
Economic experts 5. 1 21.3 52.9 5.1 3.7 11.9 
Environmental experts 57.4 25.7 7.4 2.9 1.5 5.1 
Department of agriculture 27.9 31.6 16.2 13.2 4.4 6.7 
Department of natural resources 40.7 22.2 20.0 7.4 2.2 7.5 
Note: For responses, SP = strong positive influence, WP = weak positive 
influence, NI = no impact, WN =weak negative influence, VU = strong 
negative influence, and NR = no response. 
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legislation. Both had nearly identical responses to those received for 
question 4. 
Judging from the results listed in Table 5, legislators viewed 
interest groups and other interested parties as having had significant 
influence on the bills. Farmer interest groups exerted both positive and 
negative pressure in regard to passage, but they tended to be more 
positive in nature. Chemical industry representatives clearly exerted a 
negative influence on the legislation, while agribusiness and agricultural 
commodity organizations did not exert a strong influence in either 
direction. 
The strongest influence was exerted by environmental and consumer 
groups, both supporting passage of the legislation. State departments of 
agriculture and natural resources also had strong positive influences on 
the passage. Interestingly, economists were not much of a factor in 
influencing the passage of the targeted legislation. It also is 
interesting to note that the groups with the most significant impacts on 
legislation, according to the sponsors of the legislation, tended to 
represent public rather than private interests. This may reflect the 
increased importance of the public interest groups as discussed by Bosso 
(1987). 
The most important issues raised in debates on the bills surveyed 
were groundwater contamination by agricultural chemicals and resulting 
health risks. More than 40 percent of respondents answering this question 
indicated these two issues were most important in the debate on the bill 
with which they were affiliated. The least important issue was the impact 
of the legislation on agribusiness (Table 6). 
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Table 6. Responses on issues 
If the bill was debated by the full legislative body, please rank the 
importance of each of the following issues. (1 ~ most important issue.) 
Issues 
Concern about groYndwater 
contamination by 
1 2 3 4 5 
-----------Percentage Responding------------
agricultural chemicals 40.4 21.2 20.2 2.0 6.1 5.1 5.0 
Concern about the potential 
impact of legislation of 
farm income 19.2 16.2 13.1 22.2 16.2 8.1 5.0 
Concern about the potential 
impact of legislation on 
agribusiness 4.0 18.2 13.1 25.3 26.3 6.1 7.0 
Concern about health risks 
resulting from contamination 41.4 24.2 13.1 11.1 5.1 1.0 4.1 
Concern about environmental 
risks from agricultural 
chemicals 22.2 31.3 16.2 8.1 13.1 4.1 5.0 
aNR ~ No response. 
*A sixth rank is included to indicate that an open-ended answer was allowed. 
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The most common factors affecting bill failure were concerns about 
impacts on farm income, the power of special-interest groups, and agenda 
decisions of committee chairpersons. Approximately half the legislators 
indicated they would be involved in introducing the same or similar 
legislation in the future. One-half or more of the legislators indicated 
that they planned to include provisions for groundwater monitoring, 
enforcement, and revenue enhancement in the new bills (Table 7). Those who 
indicated that they would not initiate similar legislation tended to cite 
as a reason that a competing bill was already available. In cases where 
legislation was successful, legislators said they preferred to wait for the 
legislation to be implemented before considering other action. 
The legislators surveyed had served an average of four terms. Thirty 
percent considered themselves full-time legislators, while 21 percent were 
farmers. Of the respondents to the survey, 82 belong to the Democratic 
party (61 percent) and 53 belong to the Republican party (39 percent). 
Legislators held an average of 3.74 committee assignments, and 0.55 
committee chair positions. Fifty-six percent of the legislators served on 
the committees that considered the bills they sponsored, and 14 percent of 
the legislators chaired the committees that considered their bills. 
Forty-five percent of the legislators represented areas described as rural 
or a mix of rural and suburban • 
. Survey Analysis 
To more fully investigate the factors influencing the development of 
pesticide and groundwater legislation, an exploratory multivariate analysis 
of the survey data was conducted. The analysis was descriptive in nature 
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Table 7, Responses on Provisions 
Which of the following do you plan to include in the new bill? 
Provisions 
Monitoring of groundwater 
Enforcement of legislation 
Targeting of specific chemicals in legislation 
Targeting of specific areas in legislation 
Phase-in period 
Special studies 
Revenue enchancement 
Deadlines 
Education/demonstration projects 
Research 
Percentage Indicating Yes 
56.9 
70.8 
38.5 
45.3 
39.1 
39.1 
51.6 
45.3 
43.8 
48.4 
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and was based on partial reduced form specifications rather than a fully 
developed theoretical framework. Thus, the results are preliminary and 
best viewed as a summary of survey responses. 
Data for the Analysis 
The regression analysis was conducted using two approaches for 
defining the dependent variables: by state and by legislator. State-level 
regression equations in effect summarize the bills and bill features by 
state. In contrast, legislator-level regression equations summarize the 
survey responses by the number of legislators who completed the survey, 
which varies by state. Therefore, the implicit weighting differs between 
the two types of regression equations. 
Dependent Variables. Four groups of different regression 
specifications were estimated. The first group included two equations: 
one relating the number of pesticide/groundwater regulation bills 
introduced in each state legislature (from 0 to 16), and one qualitative 
choice equation for bill introduction (l for one or more bills introduced; 
0 otherwise). For these two specifications or models there were 50 
observations--one for each state of the Union. 
The second group of regression specifications involved the policy 
instrument types reflected in the bills introduced during the survey 
period. Recall that these were classified as economic, compliance, or 
administrative. For each state and in any bills introduced, if the 
instrument in question was included, an associated qualitative choice 
variable was given a value of 1. These variables were then summed over 
policy instruments in each of the three types. Equal scoring for each 
state was given to all policy instruments within the three types. The 
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resulting summary scores were used as dependent variables in the regression 
analysis. Since the scoring was only for states that had introduced bills, 
there were 23 observations for each equation in this second group. 
In the third set of regression models, a qualitative choice variable 
for the two most commonly considered policy instruments within each of the 
three instrument categories was used as the dependent variable. The most 
commonly considered economic provisions were registration fees and dealer 
and applicator fees. The most common compliance provisions were dealer and 
applicator requirements and sale and use restrictions. The most common 
administrative provisions were enforcement and research. Therefore, six 
equations with this specification were estimated, with 23 observations for 
each. 
The fourth group of regressions involved information on interest group 
influence in the legislative process (see Table 5). Legislator impressions 
on the influence of the four most important interest groups (farmers, 
chemical companies, consumer groups, and environmentalists) were modeled. 
The value of the dependent variable representing each interest group was 
calculated using a simple scoring rule. This rule assigned a value of 2 
for each legislator reporting a strong positive influence, 1 for weak 
positive influence, 0 for no influence, -1 for weak negative influence, and 
-2 for strong negative influence. The scored response variable values were 
calculated for each legislator. The resulting variables were used as 
dependent values in this fourth set of regressions. There were 117 
observations for each of the regression models in this group. A detailed 
description of the dependent variables is given in Appendix B. 
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Independent Variables. Selected variables were used to determine 
the effects of political, economic, and physical factors on the dependent 
variables. The explanatory variables used were 
DUM: a dummy for states that were early implementers of groundwater 
protection measures (New York, Florida, California, and 
Wisconsin); 
NP: the number of pesticides found in state groundwater sources 
(Nielsen and Lee 1987); 
PSGO: the number of people in the state identified by Nielsen and Lee 
(1987) as being served by public water supplies whose 
groundwater sources may become contaminated by pesticides; 
PFI: percentage of total personal income within a state attributable 
to farming in 1986 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1987); 
AIUSE: pesticide use by state in pounds of active ingredients in 1982 
(Gianessi 1986) ; 
A general description of the models is given in Appendix B. 
Statistical Models. For all but the first group of specifications, 
three alternative regression models were estimated. The first regression 
included all the explanatory variables and ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimations. Using results from this specification, the variables with low 
significance levels were omitted, resulting in a reduced number of 
explanatory variables in the model. Two regression estimates were applied 
with the reduced model: OLS and seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). In 
general, there was little difference between the results for the two 
estimators of the parameters for the reduced model. 
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For the first group of equations, OLS was used to relate the number of 
bills introduced by each state to the explanatory variables. A logit model 
was used for the qualitative choice specification on bill introduction. 
Only OLS and SUR results are reported for models in group two (the six 
policy instrument variables). These models had qualitative dependent 
variables. However, results with estimation procedures reflecting the 
special properties of the dependent variable were inconsistent, perhaps 
because the true nonlinearity was not captured. 
Results 
Results for the Bills. Results from the first group of regressions 
are provided (Table 8). The OLS regression explained about 50 percent of 
the variation for the number of state bills introduced, and the Cragg-Ohler 
R2 was 26 percent for the qualitative choice model. Although most of 
the explanatory variables in the regressions had estimated coefficients 
that were not highly significant statistically, all had plausible signs 
with the exception of PSGO, the variable for number of people consuming 
groundwater threatened by contamination. The most significant coefficients 
in the number of bills specification were for NP and DUM, although AIUSE 
had the most statistically significant coefficient in the qualitative 
model. Both these models showed that three factors had positive impacts on 
both the likelihood of a state introducing pesticide/groundwater 
legislation, and the number of bills in states that introduced such 
legislation: (1) the number of pesticides detected in groundwater, (2) the 
tendency to have implemented earlier pesticide/groundwater regulation, and 
(3) the amount of pesticides used. The share of income attributable to 
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Table 8. Regression Analysis of Bills Introduced 
Intercept DUM PSGO NP PFI AI USE 
Nwnber of Bills 0.95 4.94 -1.15 0.72 -16.20 0.06 
( 1. 85) (2.96) (-2.59) (3.05) (-1.09) (2.00) 
R' = 0.4784 
Qualitative 
Variable for Bills -0.84 31.81 -0.33 0.32 -9.77 0.05 
(-1.58) ( 0. 00) ( -0. 82) (1.11) (-0.65) (1.61) 
R2 = 0.2597a 
Note: Figures in parentheses· indicate t-statistic levels. 
acragg-Ohler R•. 
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farming in a state negatively affected the probability that states 
introduced legislation and the number of bills introduced. 
These same explanatory factors were then used to describe the presence 
of overall categories of policy instruments and selected instruments in the 
bills introduced. Results from the second group of regressions, which were 
for the three policy instrument types, are listed in Table 9. Overall the 
explanatory power was good for this group of regressions, with 66 percent 
of the variation explained for the economic provisions, 38 percent for the 
compliance provisions, and 48 percent for the administrative provisions. 
Statistical significance levels for the estimated coefficients show that 
the important variables influencing inclusion of these types of provisions 
in the water quality bills were the number of pesticides detected in 
groundwater and the percentage of income from farming. Interestingly, the 
coefficient on the PFI variable tended to be positive in these regressions. 
This supports the impressions that legislators had of a generally positive 
influence of farmers on legislation to limit groundwater contamination from 
pesticides. However, the result contradicts the finding from the estimated 
bill introduction model (Table 8). These two results suggest the 
contradictory position of·farmers as users of chemical inputs and as 
potential consumers of contaminated groundwater. However, the result may 
in a sense be a statistical artifact. 
In Table 10, results from the third group of regressions for the 
selected policy instruments are reported. These results show somewhat less 
explanatory power and fewer statistically significant variables than the 
general policy instrument category models. However, four of the six models 
had explanatory power of 20 percent or greater. Again, percentage of 
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Table 9. Regression Analysis of Policy Instruments 
Models Intercept DUM PSGO NP PFI AI USE 
Economic Provisions 
OLS (full) 0.61 1.09 -0.03 0.02 22.51 0.02 
(2.47) (2.09) (-0.89) (0.28) (3. 50) ( 1. 26) 
R2 = 0.6622 
OLS (reduced) 0.53 0.96 25.00 0.01 
( 2. 64) (2.50) (4.44) ( 1.18) 
R2 = 0.6407 
SUR (reduced) 0.53 1.04 25.49 0.01 
(2.69) (2.90) (4.62) (1.07) 
R2 = 0.6392 
Compliance Provisions 
OLS (full) 1.15 0.03 -0.07 0.46 -7.32 0.04 
( 1. 78) (0.02) (-0.76) (2.13) (-0.43) ( 1. 08) 
R' = 0.3756 
OLS (reduced) 0.87 0.45 0.02 
(1.77) (2.61) ( 0. 94) 
R' = 0.3457 
SUR (reduced) 0.89 0.44 0.02 
(1.81) (2.59) (0.93) 
R' = 0.3455 
Administrative Provisions 
OLS (full) 1.43 -0.13 -0.96 0.50 44.25 0.04 
( 1. 64) (-0.07) (-0.78) (1.74) (1.95) (0.85) 
R' = 0.4792 
OLS (reduced) 1.14 0.50 55.81 
( 1. 68) (2. 26) (3.07) 
R' = 0.4444 
SUR (reduced) 1.18 0.48 56.01 
(1.77) (2.24) ( 3. 09) 
R• = 0.4439 
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate t-statistic levels. 
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Table 10. Regression Analysis of Policy Instruments 
Model Intercept DUM PSGO NP PFI AI USE 
Registration Fee 
OLS (full) 0.49 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 9.35 -0.004 
(2.43) (-0.22) (-0.03) (-0.03) ( 1. 79) (-0.32) 
R' = 0.2307 
OLS (reduced) 0.38 8.41 
(2.88) (2.06) 
R' = 0.1752 
SUR (reduced) 0.38 8.35 
(3.14) (2.62) 
R' = 0.1752 
Dealer and Applicator Fee 
OLS (full) 0.23 -0.003 -0.05 0.10 5.91 0.001 
(1.19) (-0.01) (-0.17) (1.52) ( 1. 15) (0.12) 
R' = 0.4529 
OLS (reduced) 0.07 0.43 11.74 
(0.59) (1.77) ( 3. 45) 
R' = 0. 4240 
SUR (reduced) 0.04 0.41 13.46 
(0.35) (2.02) (5.72) 
R' = 0.4157 
Dealer and Applicator License 
OLS (full) 0. 13 0.63 -0.04 -0.04 10.22 0.01 
(0.80) ( 1. 83) (-0.66) (-0.73) (2.40) (0. 77) 
R' = 0.2645 
OLS (reduced) 0.21 0.10 6.30 
( 1. 44) ( 1. 99) (1.58) 
R' = 0.2625 
SUR (reduced) 0.23 0.08 6.91 
( 1. 65) (1.97) (1.77) 
R' = 0.2561 
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Table 10. Continued 
Model Intercept DUM PSGO NP PFI AIUSE 
Sales and Use Restrictions 
OLS (full) 0. 45 0.48 -0.17 0.04 -6.00 0.01 
(2.32) ( l. 18) (-0.64) ( 0. 64) (-1.19) ( l. 13) 
Rl = 0.2825 
OLS (reduced) 0.42 0.48 -4.59 a. 01 
(2.69) (1.61) (-1.04) ( l. 45) 
Rl = 0.2353 
SUR (reduced) 0. 43 0.47 -4.35 o. 01 
(2.65) ( l. 88) (-1.01) (1.76) 
Rl = 0.2349 
Enforcement Provisions 
OLS (full) 0.67 0.48 -0.23 0.03 -2.39 0.01 
(3.30) ( l. 13) (-0.81) (0.44) (-0.45) (0.44) 
Rl = 0.1518 
OLS (reduced) 0.58 0.42 
(5.24) (1.41) 
Rl = 0.0902 
SUR (reduced) 0.56 0.53 
( 5. 24) (2.22) 
Rl = 0.0841 
Research Provisions 
OLS (full) 0.34 -0.29 -0.42 0.05 3.12 -0.002 
(1.53) (-0.61) (-0.14) (0.69) (0.54) (-:-0.12) 
Rl = 0.0634 
OLS (reduced) 0.41 0.03 
(2.85) (0.54) 
Rl = 0.0143 
SUR (reduced) 0. 43 0.01 
(3.30) (0.30) 
Rl = 0.0098 
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate t-statistic levels. 
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income from farming and number of pesticides detected in groundwater were 
the most significant of the explanatory variables. As expected, the 
general findings from the regressions in groups two and three were 
similar. 
Results for the Legislators. The hypothesized explanatory factors 
were used to investigate the influence of the selected interest groups on 
the bills as reported by legislators in the survey. Four interest groups 
were considered: farm, agrichemical, consumer, and environmental. These 
groups were considered because of the degree of influence they exerted 
based on the tabular analysis (Table 5). Results from the regression 
analysis applied for this fourth group of specifications are reported in 
Table 11. 
The farm interest model showed that the percentage of income from 
farming in a state, the number of pesticides detected in groundwater, and 
the number of people served by public water supplies in areas with 
contamination potential all negatively impacted the influence of farm 
groups on pesticide/groundwater legislation. However, the dummy variable 
for early-implementing states and the amount of pesticides used had a 
positive impact on the influence of the farm interest group. 
The estimated impacts of these same variables on the influence exerted 
by agrichemical representatives was similar to that for the farm interest, 
with a sign change on the state dummy coefficient, which was statistically 
insignificant in both models. In each of these models, the percentage farm 
income variable was significant. Results for PFI indicate that the higher 
the proportion of farm income in a state, the more likely farmers and 
agrichemical representatives were to have a negative influence on 
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Table 11. Regression Analysis of Interest Group Influence 
Model Intercept DUM PSGO NP PFI A !USE 
Farmers 
OLS (full) l. 32 0.38 -0.81 -0.24 -25.97 0.03 
(4.77) (0.83) (-2.17) (-3.17) (-3.37) (2.53) 
R' = 0.2281 
OLS (reduced) 1.28 -0.63 -0.22 -25.70 0.03 
(4. 71) (-2.09) (-3.09) (-3.35) (2.43) 
R' = 0.2222 
SUR (reduced) 1.21 -0.50 -0.22 -24.82 0.03 
(4.65) (-1.89) (-3.12) (-3.26) (2.26) 
R' = 0.2206 
Agrichemical Representatives 
OLS (full) -0.10 -0.33 -0.15 -0.19 -18.36 0.02 
(-0.38) (-0. 74) (-0.42) (-2.59). (-2.48) (1. 85) 
R' = 0.1394 
OLS (reduced) -0.23 -0.22 -16.62 0.02 
(-1.11) (-3.16) (-2.33) (2.30) 
R' = 0. 1228 
SUR (reduced) -0.23 -0.21 -16.14 0.02 
(-1.13) (-3.13) (-2.30) (2.24) 
R' = 0.1227 
Consumer Groups 
OLS (full) 0.53 -0.43 0.42 0. 13 2.69 -0.01 
(2.69) (-1.33) ( 1. 58) (2.31) (0.49) C:-0.59) 
R' = 0.1404 
OLS (reduced) 0.59 -0.36 0.32 0.11 
(3. 42) (-1.35) ( 1. 84) (2.36) 
R' = 0.1367 
SUR (reduced) 0.61 -0.43 0.30 0.12 
(3.55) (-1.63) ( 1. 73) (2.51) 
R' = 0.1357 
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Table 11. Continued 
Model Intercept DUM PSGO NP PFI AIUSE 
Envirorunental Groups 
OLS (full) 1.04 -0.09 0.22 0.10 8.25 -0.01 
(5.57) (-0.30) ( 0. 89) ( 1. 85) (1.59) (-1.09) 
R2 = 0.0792 
OLS (reduced) 1.15 0.09 7.05 -0.004 
(7.87) ( 1. 96) ( l. 41) (-0.69) 
R2 = 0.0701 
SUR (reduced) 1.15 0.09 6.82 -0.004 
(7.89) (1.93) (1.38) (-0.64) 
R' = 0.0701 
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate t-statistic levels. 
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pesticide/groundwater legislation. The explanatory power was reflected by 
R>'s of 23 percent in the full farm model and 14 percent in the full 
agrichemical model. 
The consumer and environmental interest model results are also given 
in Table 11. Results of these regressions show that as the numbers 
increased for pesticides detected in groundwater, the population publicly 
serviced by groundwater sources in potentially contaminated areas, and the 
percentage of farm income, consumer groups exerted a stronger positive 
influence on the legislators. A negative sign on the state dummy variable 
suggested that consumer and environmental groups tended to exert a weaker 
influence on legislators in states that were early implementors of 
groundwater protection. The most statistically significant variable for 
these two models was the number of pesticides detected in groundwater 
supplies. The explanatory power of the two full models is shown by R''s of 
14 percent for the consumer groups and 8 percent for the environmental 
groups. 
Overall, the exploratory regression results show that the variables 
considered in the exploratory or descriptive models explain significant 
variation for bill ~~traduction, interest group influence, and policy 
instruments incorporated in the surveyed legislation. Results also 
indicate the importance of specific variables in reflecting tendencies of 
states to consider groundwater protection legislation, the number of bills, 
interest group influence on the legislation, and types of policy 
instruments included. 
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Conclusion 
Advances in the detection of pesticides in the environment, along 
with increased awareness of potential health and environmental issues from 
pesticides, have stimulated a demand for federal pesticide/groundwater 
policies, which have not been forthcoming. As a consequence, a number of 
states have responded with introductions of legislative measures. As 
states have developed these policies, emphasis has changed from protection 
of pesticide users toward protection of the general public from the 
external effects of pesticide use. 
Pesticide/groundwater legislation introduced by the states in the 
1987-1988 legislative period has been examined, with specific emphasis on 
key states and bills. A review of legislation in key states indicates 
movement toward the increased inclusion of economic ·and compliance 
instruments in more recent bills, following early legislation in which 
policy provisions were more administrative in nature. 
Sponsors of this legislation were surveyed for their impressions 
about the legislative process. Data was collected on factors that 
influence the introduction and passage of bills, the importance of several 
interest groups in the legislative process, the issues involved, and plans 
for future legislation. Generally, farmers, chemical companies, consumer 
groups, and environmentalists all were seen to exert exerted strong 
influence on the legislation. 
An exploratory regression analysis of the factors influencing bill 
introduction, bill features, and legislators' impressions was then 
conducted. The explanatory variables used captured economic, political, 
and physical characteristics of the states. Results suggest substantial 
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effects of these variables across different specifications and for the 
features of the bills as well as the impressions of legislators. The 
results for the variable intended to reflect farmer interests were mixed, 
probably because of the potential for both positive and negative impacts 
of pesticides on this interest group. 
In recent years states have continued to take a role in developing 
pesticide/groundwater legislation more active than that of the federal 
government. Even EPA's Proposed Pesticide Strategy suggests a role for 
the federal government as a standard setter for the states. The states 
must then develop compliance programs. Although benefits are derived from 
programs tailored to states, inconsistencies in the programs from state to 
state also are a result. The patchwork of legislation has limitations for 
economies of scope. However, results from the analysis indicate that 
states that develop these policies have followed highly systematic 
tendencies. 
Finally, an intent of the analysis and survey was to contribute to 
the understanding of the political economy of pesticide policy 
development; i.e., the issue of what factors are shaping 
pesticide/groundwater policies and how these policies are being shaped. 
Chavas (1989), Rausser (1989), and Cummings and Harrison (1989) highlight 
the importance of understanding the political and economic nature of 
policy formation for more effective economic analysis. The results 
obtained in this paper indicate that the impact of interest groups on 
legislation is apparent even in simple exploratory models. Results of the 
survey of legislators and pesticide/groundwater legislation have provided 
insights on factors shaping policy, the role of interest groups, and the 
types of policy instruments likely to be considered in future state bills. 
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Appendixes 
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First we would like to get some basic information on the legislation. 
For the questions where the responses are numbered, please circle the number 
by your answer. 
1. Please indicate how this bill was introduced: 
1 Individual Legislator 
2 Group of Legislators 
3 Legislative Committee 
2. How important were each of the following factors in stimulating interest 
in drafting this bill? 
1 Very Important (VI) 
2 Somewhat Important (SI) 
3 Moderate Importance (HI) 
4 Somewhat Unimportant (SU) 
5 Very Unimportant (VU) 
Factors Stimulating Interest VI SI HI su vu 
a) State or federally 
sponsored research 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Special interest 
group concerns 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Commission appointed 
by legislature 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Legislative proposals 
from other states 1 2 3 4 5 
e) National legislative 
proposals 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Informal discussions on 
bill between legislators 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Interim Committees 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Media 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Any other factors 
(Please explain below) 1 2 3 4 5 
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3. How long has concern about this type of bill been expressed? 
l One year or less 
2 One to three years 
3 Three to five years 
4 More than five years 
lt. Please indicate the influence the following interest groups exerted 
before and during the introduction of this bill: 
1 Strong positive influence (SP) 
2 Weak positive influence (WP) 
3 No impact (NI) 
4 Weak negative influence (WN) 
5 Strong negative influence (SN) 
Interest Grou2s SP WP NI WN SN 
a) Farmers 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Agricultural commodity 
organizations 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Agribusiness 
representatives 
(other than chemical) 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Chemical industry 
representatives l 2 3 4 5 
e) Consumer groups 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Medical experts l 2 3 4 5 
g) Economic experts 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Environmental experts 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Department of Agriculture 
(or equivalent department) l 2 3 4 5 
j) Department of Natural 
Resources (or 
equivalent department) l 2 3 4 5 
k) Other interest groups 
(Please explain below) 1 2 3 4 5 
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In the following section, we would like to request information about the 
debate (on the floor) and formal hearings (in committee) on the proposed 
legislation. 
5. If the bill was debated by the full legislative body, please rank the 
importance of each of the following issues. (Use 1 to represent the most 
important issue, 6 to represent the least important issue). 
Issues Rank 
a) Concern about groundwater 
contamination by 
agricultural chemicals 
b) Concern about the potential 
impact of legislation on 
farm income 
c) Concern about the potential 
iropact of legislation on 
agribusiness 
d) Concern about health 
risks due to contamination 
e) Concern about environmental 
risks from agricultural 
chemicals 
f) Concern about any other 
(Please explain below) 
issues 
6. Was the proposed bill modified as a result of debate or hearings? 
1 Yes 
2 No (Skip to Question 8) 
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7. What types of modifications were made to the bill? 
Modification Yes No 
a) Provisions for monitoring 
of groundwater l 2 
b) Provisions for enforcement 
of legislation 1 2 
c) Targeting of specific 
chemicals in legislation l 2 
d) Targeting of specific 
geographical areas in 
legislation 1 2 
e) Phase-in period 1 2 
f) Provisions for special 
studies 1 2 
g) Provisions for revenue 
enhancement 1 2 
h) Deadlines 1 2 
i) Provisions for education/ 
demonstration projects 1 2 
j) Provisions for research 1 2 
k) Other modifications 
(Please explain below) l 2 
49 
8. What groups tended to support or oppose the proposed legislation? 
1 Strong supporter (SS) ,. 
2 Weak supporter (WS) 
3 No position (NP) 
4 Weak opponent (WO) 
5 Strong opponent (SO) 
Interest Group ss WS NP wo so 
a) Farmers 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Agricultural commodity 
organizations 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Agribusiness 
representatives 
(other than chemical) 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Chemical industry 
representatives 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Consumer groups 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Medical experts 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Economic experts 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Environmental experts 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Department of Agriculture 
(or equivalent department) 1 2 3 4 5 
j) Department of Natural 
Resources (or equivalent 
department) 1 2 3 4 5 
k) Other interest groups 
(Please explain below) 1 2 3 4 5 
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9. If the bill was defeated or vetoed, how important were the following 
factors? 
1 Very Important (VI) 
2 Somewhat Important (SI) 
3 Moderate Importance (KI) 
4 Somewhat Unimportant (SU) 
5 Very Unimportant (VU) 
Factors 
a) Questions of state 
jurisdiction 
b) Insufficient evidence of 
the net detrimental impact 
of chemicals on the 
environment 
c) Insufficient evidence of 
significant health risks 
from chemical residuals 
d) Concern about impacts on 
farm income 
e) Concern about impacts on 
agribusiness income 
f) Concern about the impacts 
on the overall state 
economy 
g) Feasibility of 
administration 
h) Power of special interest 
group 
i) Agenda decisions of 
committee chairman 
j) Bill died at end of 
legislative session 
k) Any other factors 
(Please explain below) 
VI 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
l 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
SI KI su vu 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
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10. If the bill 
involved? 
was defeated or vetoed, what interest groups, if any, were 
1 Involved in defeat/veto (I) 
2 Not involved in defeat/veto (NI) 
Interest GrouE I NI 
a) Farmers 1 2 
b) Agricultural commodity 
organizations l 2 
c) Agribusiness 
representatives 
(other than chemical) 1 2 
d) Chemical industry 
representatives l 2 
e) Consumer groups l 2 
f) Other interest groups 
(Please explain below) l 2 
Next we are requesting information on the prospects of groundwater 
legislation in your state. 
11. If passed, do you plan to introduce a related bill in the future? 
l Yes (Skip to Question 13) 
2 No (Skip to Question 15) 
3 Does not apply 
12. If failed, do you plan to reintroduce this bill or a related bill? 
1 Yes (Continue to Question 13) 
2 No (Skip to Question 15) 
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13. Which of the following do you plan to include in the new bill? 
Features of New Bill Yes No 
a) Provisions for monitoring 
of groundwater l 2 
b) Provisions for enforcement 
of legislation 1 2 
c) Targeting of specific 
chemicals in legislation l 2 
d) Targeting of specific 
geographical- areas in 
legislation l 2 
e) Phase-in period l 2 
f) Provisions for special 
studies l 2 
g) Provisions for revenue 
enhancement l 2 
h) Deadlines l 2 
i) Provisions for education/ 
demonstration projects 1 2 
j) Provisions for research 1 2 
k) Other modifications 
(Please explain below) 1 2 
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14. What groups do you expect to support or oppose the new bill? 
l Strong supporter (SS) 
2 Weak supporter (WS) 
3 No impact (NI) 
4 Weak opponent (WO) 
5 Strong opponent (SO) 
Interest Groups ss ws NI wo so 
a) Farmers l 2 3 4 5 
b) Agricultural commodity 
organizations 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Agribusiness 
representatives 
(other than chemical) 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Chemical industry 
representatives 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Consumer groups 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Medical experts 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Economic experts 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Environmental experts l 2 3 4 5 
i) State Department of 
Agriculture (or 
equivalent department) 1 2 3 4 5 
j) State Department of 
Natural Resources (or 
equivalent department) 1 2 3 4 5 
k) Other interest groups 
(Please explain below) 1 2 3 4 5 
Skip to question 16 
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15. How important were the following factors in your decision to not 
reintroduce this bill, or introduce a new bill? 
l Very Important (VI) 
2 Somewhat Important (SI) 
3 Moderate Importance (Mil 
4 Somewhat Unimportant (SU) 
5 Very Unimportant (VU) 
Factors VI SI MI su vu 
a) Competing bill was 
available l 2 3 4 5 
b) Limited interest in water 
quality legislation l 2 3 4 5 
c) Little chance of passage l 2 3 4 5 
d) Administration of the 
bill not feasible l 2 3 4 5 
e) Question of state 
authority· l 2 3 4 5 
f) Uncertainties raised in 
the debate on the current 
proposal l 2 3 4 5 
g) Need for further study of 
monitoring and regulatory 
mechanisms l 2 3 4 5 
h) Other factors 
(Please explain below) l 2 3 4 5 
Finally, we have some questions about you and your constituency. 
16. As of the 1988 session, how many terms had you served as legislator? 
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17. During the term in which you sponsored this bill, how many bills did you 
sponsor? (Include this bill) 
18. How many of the bills you sponsored passed into law? 
19. Apart from the legislature, what is your occupation? 
20. Which best describes your constituency? 
1 Urban 
2 Rural 
3 Suburban 
21. Are there any other comments you would like to make regarding the history 
of the bill, plans for administration of the bill, the distribution of 
the costs and benefits of the bill, or any other aspects of the bill? 
Iowa State University appreciates your help with this project. If you wish 
to have a copy of this study please circle (Yes No). Thank you. 
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Appendix B 
Dependent Variable Description 
The endogenous variables used in the analysis are described below by 
group. 
Group one: 
NB: The number of pesticide/groundwater bills introduced during 
the 1987-88 period by state (range from 0 to 16). 
SB: 1 if pesticide/groundwater bill was introduced; 
= 0 otherwise 
Group two: 
DEP: The sum of qualitative choice variables representing 
consideration of any economic provisions over all bills by 
state • 
.. 
= Xi=O EPi 
where EPi = 1 if any economic provision was considered in a 
bill; 
= 0 otherwise. 
DCP: The sum of qualitative choice variables representing 
consideration of any compliance provisions over all bills by 
state. 
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where CP. = l if any compliance provision was considered in a 
J. 
bill; 
• 0 otherwise. 
DAP: The sum of qualitative choice variables representing 
Group three: 
DERF: 
DEPF: 
DCPR: 
consideration of any administrative provisions over all bills 
by state. 
where AP. s l if any administrative provision was considered 
J. 
in a bill; 
= 0 otherwise. 
A qualitative choice variable representing consideration of 
registration fees for any bill by state 
• l if registration fees were considered in any bill; 
= 0 otherwise. 
A qualitative choice variable representing consideration of 
dealer and applicator fees for any bill by state 
= l if dealer and applicator fees were considered in any bill 
by state; 
• 0 otherwise. 
A qualitative choice variable representing consideration of 
dealer and applicator requirements for any bill by state 
= l if dealer and applicator fees were considered in any 
bill; 
= 0 otherwise. 
DCUR: 
DAEP: 
DARP: 
Group four: 
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A qualitative choice variable representing consideration of 
sale and use restrictions for any bill by state 
= 1 if sale and use restrictions were considered in any 
bill; 
• 0 otherwise. 
A qualitative choice variable representing consideration of 
enforcement provisions for any bill by state 
= 1 if enforcement prpvisions were considered in any bill; 
= 0 otherwise. 
A qualitative choice variable representing consideration of 
research provisions for any bill by state 
= 1 if research provisions were considered in any bill; 
= 0 otherwise. 
Q4A: A scored variable representing the influence of farm groups 
on a bill as reported by a legislator (range from -2 to 2). 
Q4D: A scored variable representing the influence of chemical 
industry groups on a bill as reported by a legislator (range 
from -2 to 2). 
Q4E: A scored variable representing the influence of consumer 
groups on a bill as reported by a legislator (range from -2 
to 2). 
Q4H: A scored variable representing the influence of environmental 
groups on a bill as reported by a legislator (range from -2 
to 2). 
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A generalized form of all the models considered is as follows: 
NB : a0 + a 1 * DUM + a2 * NP + a3 * PSGO + a4 * PFI + a5 * AIUSE 
where a.'s represent linear coefficients. 
~ 
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